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Abstract
For groups that must make several decisions of similar form, we dene a simple and
general mechanism that is designed to promote social eÆciency. The mechanism links the
various decisions by forcing agents to budget their representations of preferences so that
the frequency of preferences across problems conforms to the underlying distribution of
preferences. We show that as the mechanism operates over a growing number decisions,
the welfare costs of incentive constraints completely disappear. In addition, as the number
of decisions being linked grows, a truthful strategy is increasingly successful and secures
the eÆcient utility level for an agent.
JEL classication numbers: D71, D72, D74, D78, C72
Key words: Mechanism Design, Linking Decisions, Bundling, Incentive Compatibility,
Collective Decision Making
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1 Introduction
Over the past fty years we have learned that social welfare possibilities depend not only
on resources and technology, but equally and most critically on incentive constraints and
the ability of social institutions to mediate those constraints. Thus, voting systems, labor
contracts, nancial contracts, auction forms, and a host of other practical arrangements
are no commonly analyzed in terms of information and strategic play, and understood in
terms of their ability to mediate incentive constraints.
One of the most fundamental lessons of this new understanding is that when classical
problems, such as oligopoly, bargaining, and principal agent relationships, are repeated,
the limits of cooperation commonly increase, and sometimes in the limit allow for out-
comes that are fully eÆcient. This literature is built on an idea that is rooted in everyday
experience: namely that failure of cooperation today can be answered tomorrow in a
manner that encourages continual cooperation.
The purpose of this paper is to initiate a parallel investigation along a dierent di-
mension. We argue that similar gains in eÆciency can be realized when classical incentive
problems are linked, not temporally, but across separate problems or separate aspects of
a social decision, exchange, or negotiation. We exploit the idea that when several inde-
pendent problems are linked, or when there are several independent aspects of a given
problem, then it makes sense to speak of rationing an agent's representations. As in
everyday experience, agents may be asked to \reveal the issues that they regard as most
important", and the position that one's \needs are extreme with respect to all aspects
of the oer that is on the table" may be taken as a signal that an agent is not serious
about a negotiation. Here, when agents are asked to reveal their preferences over dier-
ent problems or dierent aspects of a problem, they are not permitted to claim to have
extreme preferences over all of them.
We should emphasize that while there is some parallel between linking decisions across
problems and considering repeated games, the reasoning behind the results obtained here
is very dierent from that underlying folk theorems. To understand how and why, it is
useful to be more specic about our ideas and analysis.
Consider a set of decision problems, and suppose that agents' preferences are com-
pletely separable and independently distributed across these problems. This indepen-
dence ensures that any improvements obtained in eÆciency are not the result of some
complementarities or correlation across problems, but really due to the method of linking
itself. In our mechanism, agents are constrained to represent their types, which across
a set of linked decision problems will be a vector, in ways that conform (as closely as
possible) to the underlying distribution. They are not, for example, allowed to represent
themselves as having a \bad draw" on more than the expected number of problems on
which they \should" have a bad draw. Within this constraint they play a Bayesian game
across the linked problems, where they can misrepresent their preferences on individual
problems but must respect the underlying distribution in the aggregate. Now, consider
any fully (that is, ex ante) Pareto eÆcient social choice function that indicates what
decisions we would like to make on each problem as a function of preferences, and leads
to ex ante expected utilities of u
1
; : : : ; u
n
for the agents. Generally, such an ideal rule will
not be implementable in the presence of incentives on any individual problem. However,
we show that this simple mechanism, based on the rationing of type announcements,
has the property that all equilibria will approximate the desired function as the num-
ber of problems that are linked becomes large.
1
We do this by showing that truth is a
very powerful strategy, as by being truthful (as closely as possible under the rationing of
announcements) will secure an agent i his or her part of the ex ante expected utility, u
i
.
In addition to the limiting results, we shall also see that signicant eÆciency gains
are possible from linking even a few problems. We illustrate these small number gains in
the context of a series of examples that will also make the approach and general results
quite clear. Without further ado, let us turn to some examples and we will return to
further discussion of our results and broader interpretations at the end of the paper.
2 Examples
Our rst example is almost paradigmatic for voting theory and illustrates some of the
main ideas.
Example 1 A Binary Decision - Voting Problem
Consider two agents who are making a binary decision that aects both of their well-
being. For example, the decision may be whether or not to undertake a given project or
law, possibly including a specication of how the costs of the implemented project will
be distributed. The decision is represented by d 2 fa; bg.
The agents have utilities for each possible decision. Let v
i
(d) denote agent i's value
for taking decision d. The important information for this problem is the dierence in
1
Note that this provides another important distinction from folk theorems repeated games. Rather
than having many equilibria some of which are ineÆcient, here we have all equilibria converging to the
same desired eÆcient utility levels.
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valuations between decisions a and b. An agent's preferences are thus summarized by
the dierence in utilities between decisions a and b, denoted v
i
= v
i
(b)  v
i
(a).
If v
i
is positive for both agents, then unanimously preferred decision is d = b, and if
v
i
is negative for both agents then the unanimously preferred decision is d = a. In the
case where v
i
> 0 while v
j
< 0, then which decision should be made is more ambiguous.
To keep things simple for now, consider the case where each v
i
is independently and
identically distributed and takes on values in f 2; 1; 1; 2g with equal probability.
Let us start by considering a very simple and natural mechanism in this context. The
two agents vote over the decisions a and b. If they both vote for the same decision, then
that decision is taken. Otherwise a fair coin is ipped.
This mechanism has some nice features: it is incentive compatible (in fact dominant
strategy incentive compatible) to vote for one's preferred decision. The mechanism is
also anonymous and neutral. Moreover, it satises some eÆciency criteria. It is an ex
post Pareto eÆcient mechanism; that is, the decision that ends up being made is always
Pareto eÆcient relative to the realized preferences. It also is a second best mechanism
in that it maximizes the total sum of utilities, subject to the incentive constraints.
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It is important however to note that the mechanism is not ex ante eÆcient and does
not maximize the total sum of agents utilities overall. Both agents would prefer to make
the following improvements: if the agents disagree and one of the agents has an intensity
of 2 while the other has an intensity of 1 but of the opposite signs, then the decision
is made in favor of the agent who cares more; that is, has the intensity of 2. This
sometimes goes against an agent's wishes and sometimes for the agent. The reason that
this improves over ipping a coin is that it goes in the agent's favor in situations where
the agent cares more and against the agent when the agent cares less.
The big problem with this improvement, of course, is that it is not incentive compat-
ible. If we try to ask the agents whether they care a lot or a little, they are always better
o pretending to care a lot.
In terms of understanding the diÆculties here, note the following feature. Regardless
of whether an agent has preferences 1 or 2, he or she has the same preferences over any
lotteries over the decisions - always preferring the lottery with more weight on decision
b. There is no incentive compatible way to discover whether the agent cares a lot or a
little about the decisions.
Linking Two Such Decisions
2
It is the unique such mechanism which is also anonymous and neutral (a version of May's (1951)
theorem). Other second best mechanisms are the dictatorial mechanism where one of the agents gets to
pick the decision unilaterally (violating anonymity), and variations on the voting where a non-fair coin is
used and, for instance, favors one of the decisions which is labeled the status-quo (violating neutrality).
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Next, let us consider a situation where there are two dierent decisions to be made.
These might even be two dierent \features" of a single decision.
Let us label them d
1
2 fa
1
; b
1
g and d
2
2 fa
2
; b
2
g. Here each agent has preferences over
each decision, and values a combination (d
1
; d
2
) according to v
i
(d
1
; d
2
) = v
i1
(d
1
)+v
i2
(d
2
).
Again, we can characterize the preferences over a decision d
j
by a utility dierence
v
ij
= v
ij
(b)  v
ij
(a).
Let these v
ij
's be i.i.d. on f 2; 1; 1; 2g with equal probabilities.
Thus, we simply have considered a duplication of the previous decision problem.
One approach to solving this problem is simply to hold separate votes over the two
problems.
Note, however, that this is no longer even ex post eÆcient.
To see this, consider a situation where agent 1 has values (2,1) for the respective
problems, and agent 2 has values ( 1; 2) for the respective problems. The votes will be
tied on both decision problems, and coin ips will decide each. So one possible outcome
of the coin ips results in a decision of (a
1
; b
2
), which leads to a total utility of  2. This
outcome is Pareto ineÆcient as both agents would prefer to have the decision of (b
1
; a
2
),
which leads to a total utility of 0.
It is useful to note that what was an ex ante ineÆciency in the isolated problem,
becomes an ex post ineÆciency in the duplicated problem. Eectively the trades that
agents would like to make across possible states in the isolated problem, become trades
that the agents would like to make across dierent problems in the duplicated setting!
This allows us to nd mechanisms that do better in the setting with two problems;
and in fact, it even oers us a pretty good suggestion as to how we should do this.
Consider the following linked mechanism that operates over the two problems. We
allow each agent to announce only one utility of magnitude 2 (either a  2 or a 2) out of
the two problems and require that the other utility be of a magnitude 1 (either a -1 or
a 1). We then run the ex ante eÆcient mechanism on these constrained announcements.
So, if agents announcements agree on the sign, we choose the alternative that they both
favor. If the agents disagree on sign, then we decide in favor of the agent whose utility
has a larger magnitude and ip a coin in the event of a tie on magnitudes.
3
3
Note that we can also implement the above linked mechanism in the following manner. We give
agents each three (indivisible) votes and require them to cast at least one vote on each problem. This
is reminiscent of Casella's (2002) storable votes which may be spread across time. However, we have
placed more restrictions on votes (requiring that one be spent on each problem) which helps enhance
eÆciency. Also, once we move beyond this simple two decision-two intensity voting setting our approach
bears little relationship to storable votes, as we shall see shortly in examples of a bargaining setting,
insurance setting, and others.
4
It is straightforward to check that there is a Bayesian equilibrium with the following
features:
 if an agent's magnitude of utility diers across the two problems then he or she
announces utilities truthfully.
 if an agent has two utilities of the same magnitude, then the agent announces
the correct signs but the agent ips a coin and lies about the magnitude of the
corresponding utility.
In fact, all equilibria have similar features up to the tie breaking, something that we
will come back to discuss more generally below.
The equilibria of the linked mechanism is not quite ex ante Pareto eÆcient. Never-
theless, the equilibrium outcomes of the linked mechanism still Pareto dominate from
any perspective (ex ante, interim, or ex post) voting on the problems separately.
4
To get a feeling for the level of Pareto improvement of the linked mechanism over the
separate voting, let's look at the probability of not choosing a total utility maximizing
outcome. It turns out that the linked mechanism has cut the probability of making
such errors in half relative to that of running two separate voting mechanisms. To see
this rst note that the only situations errors can arise are on problems where the agents
disagree both on sign and magnitude of preference. Conditional on this case, a separate
(non-linked) voting mechanism will ip a coin and make an error with probability 1/2.
In the linked mechanism, an error will only occur with probability 1/4. This is seen as
follows. There are four equally likely sub-cases:
(a) each agent's magnitude on the other problem diers from that on this problem,
which implies that announcements will be truthful and no error will be made;
(b) agent 1 has equal magnitudes across the problems but not agent 2, in which case
there is a conditional probability of 1/2 that the two agents' announcements will
match and then a conditional probability of 1/2 that the coin ip will result in an
error - so a probability of 1/4 of an error conditional on this sub-case;
(c) agent 2 has equal magnitudes across the problems but not agent 1; and so this is
analogous to sub-case (b);
(d) both agents have equal magnitudes across the problems in which case the announce-
ments and coin ip are all essentially random and the conditional probability of an
error is 1/2.
4
In ex post comparisons one has to be careful about the timing: before or after coin ips. There is
a chance that an agent gets lucky and wins all coin ips, and so comparisons after coin ips makes the
two mechanism non-comparable. However, if make comparisons after types are known, but before coins
are ipped, then the linked mechanism dominates the separate voting.
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As each sub-case occurs with probability 1/4, we have a probability of 1/4 (
1
4
(0+
1
4
+
1
4
+
1
2
)) of making an error in total across the sub-cases. Thus, linking the problems has
cut the probability of making an error on each problem in half.
The reason why linking the two decisions together helps out is as follows. The ineÆ-
ciencies in the separate problems are due to our inability to discover the agents' preference
intensities. Linking the decisions together allows us to ask a question of the form, \Which
decision do you care more about?" This can be answered in an incentive compatible way
in the linked problem, but we cannot even ask this question in the separate problem.
Eectively, linking the problem has changed things that were ex ante ineÆciencies { \I
would like to make trades over my dierent possible future selves," to ex post ineÆcien-
cies { \I now actually have dierent selves and would be happy to make trades across
them". So xing ex post ineÆciencies in the linked problem, is in a sense overcoming ex
ante ineÆciencies that could not be overcome in the original problem. Of course, if there
are also ex post ineÆciencies in the original problem, we can also try to x those.
Let us make an important observation in this regard { no interpersonal comparability
in utilities is needed in the above analysis. The ex ante ineÆciency of the separate voting
is not due to uncertainty regarding which of the two agents cares more - but rather due
to the fact that both agents would be willing to make trades across dierent states if
they could. It is intrapersonal comparisons that are at the heart here. All of the points
that we will make in this paper are valid even if we work with forms of Pareto eÆciency
that don't make any implicit interpersonal comparisons.
Linking Many Such Decisions
We have seen that linking two decisions together helps improve the total performance
of the optimal mechanism. Still, it did not reach complete eÆciency. What if we link
more decisions together? Indeed, linking more decisions together helps further and in
the limit leads us to full Pareto eÆciency.
This is easily seen in the context of the above example. Suppose that we have linked n
independent decisions together of the type described above, where n is a \large" number.
Consider the following mechanism. The agents cast a vote on each problem j for either
a
j
or b
j
. The agents are also allowed to declare
n
2
problems for which they care more
intensely for; that is, for which jv
ij
j = 2. If there is a tie in the vote, then the tie is
broken in favor of a the agent who has declared they care more intensely for the problem
- if there is exactly one such agent - and otherwise a fair coin is ipped.
With large n, the agents will care intensely for approximately
1
2
of the problems.
They may end up caring intensely for a few more or less problems than exactly
1
2
, in
which case the mechanism will force them to \lie" on some small fraction of problems.
However, again there exists an equilibrium where agents are always truthful about the
signs of their utility for the problems and are truthful about magnitude up to the extent
that they can be under the constraints. That is, if an agent cares intensely about more
6
than
n
2
problems, then the agent randomly picks
n
2
of those to declare as high magnitude
and declares low magnitude on the others; and similarly for the case where an agent has
a low magnitude on more than
n
2
problems.
As n becomes large, the fraction of problems where agents' announcements are not
completely truthful goes to 0, and so the probability that the decision on any given
problem is incorrect goes to 0. So, on each problem, we are converging to the ex ante
(and thus interim and ex post) eÆcient decisions.
As we shall argue below, this will in fact be true of all equilibria of this mechanism.
We should mention that the linking method we have proposed above can be further
improved upon, by taking advantage of some specic aspects of the problem. Generally,
we will not be proposing the best possible method of linking decisions, but we will propose
a simple method that will reach full ex ante eÆciency in the limit. To see that there
are variations on this mechanism which perform slightly better along the sequence, but
of course reach the same limit, consider the following improved (in fact optimal) version
of a linking mechanism. Start with voting and declarations of which problems agents
care more intensely for, just as above. However, allow an agent to designate more or
fewer than
n
2
problems that they care intensely for, and then let the mechanism choose
for the agent on which problems to assign a higher magnitude { so that the number
of such announcements still comes out at
n
2
. The mechanism picks these problems by
coordinating across the two agents in such a way to best match the announcements. So,
each agent still has rights to claim to care intensely about
n
2
problems. However, when
an agent happens to care about fewer problems, in the previous mechanism they would
end up picking some extras randomly. It is actually more eÆcient to coordinate those
across agents, so that one agent's \lies" don't fall on problems where the other agent
truly cares intensely. By allowing the mechanism instead of the agents to pick the \lies,"
eÆciency is improved.
This voting example has provided some of the basic ideas that underlie more general
results. To point out how this will work more generally in terms of setting, possible
utility functions, numbers of agents, worrying about multiple equilibria, etc., we discuss
some other examples before proving the general theorem.
Example 2 Taking Turns
In the above example it is pretty clear that in equilibrium players wish to announce
\approximately truthfully" under the linked mechanism, in that they will truthfully
announce which problems they care about more intensely, except to the extent that they
hit the constraint. Let us now show that this is not just an artifact of the two magnitudes
of utility, but holds more generally. To keep the exposition simple, we consider a problem
with three magnitudes of utility. We will see shortly that the results are fully general,
and that will be pretty clear when seeing how the arguments work in this example.
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Let us consider a situation with three agents dividing up an inheritance. There are
a number of items, m  3, to be divided among the agents. Agent i's value for item j
is denoted v
ij
and takes on values in f1; 2; 3g, each with equal likelihood. The v
ij
's are
independently distributed across agents and items.
If there were only one problem, then it is clear that there is no anonymous, incentive
compatible, and ex ante eÆcient mechanism.
5
Anonymity and ex ante eÆciency require
one to give the item to the agent who has the highest value for it, with some need for tie
breaking. Clearly this is not incentive compatible as each agent would declare that he or
she values the item at a level of 3. The best we can do respecting incentive compatibility
and anonymity is simply to randomly assign the item. So here, if we try to operate things
separately on each item, we end up simply randomly assigning items.
Let us link the decisions as follows. Require each agent declare a 3 for exactly
m
3
items, a 2 for exactly
m
3
items, and a 1 for the remaining items. Then operate the ex ante
eÆcient and anonymous mechanism where each item is given to the agent with the highest
valuation for that item with random tie breaking, based on these announcements.
6
In this
particular context, there is a very natural counterpart to this linking mechanism which is
to randomly pick an ordering over the agents and let them take turns in picking items - or
in the terminology of sports: we hold a \draft". That mechanism was studied by McAfee
(1992) who showed that there is an equilibrium of the taking turns mechanism (which
he called the alternating selection mechanism) which leads to eÆciency in the limit.
Indeed, these two methods are intuitively almost the same and lead to the same limiting
distribution over the allocation of items in their \approximately" truthful equilibria. The
advantage of the linking mechanism we describe, of course, is that it while it is still simple
it applies to any decision problem, well beyond the allocation of a set of indivisible goods.
In analyzing the mechanism(s) here, one can directly verify that there exists an \ap-
proximately truthful" equilibrium. This is not quite as obvious as it was in the previous
example, and requires a bit of work. In particular, it would conceivably be advantageous
for an agent to not announce a 3 on an item where he or she really has a value of 3 if he
or she expected to get that item with high probability in any case, and then announce
that 3 somewhere else to increase the probability of obtaining some other item. The full
details of the argument appear later, but let us describe it loosely now. Suppose that
the other agents are announcing approximately truthfully and randomly picking where
to lie when they have to lie to meet the constraints on announcements. Then to a given
agent the distribution over other agents' announcements looks identical across problems.
Given this, an agent cannot gain (and in fact would suer in expectation) by permuting
5
There is always an ex ante eÆcient and incentive compatible mechanism: always give all items to
the rst agent. So anonymity plays a role here. Alternatively, dropping anonymity note that there is no
incentive compatible mechanism that maximizes the sum of the utilities across agents.
6
A related idea would be to have agents submit rankings of objects. Chakraborty, Gupta and Har-
baugh (2002) show how a mechanism based on providing rankings of objects can help a seller of multiple
objects when trying to communicate values of those objects to prospective bidders in auctions. See also
Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2003b), who explore benets from rank orderings in cheap talk in sender
receiver games.
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their true valuations; for example by reversing their valuations on two items, such as
saying 3 when they have a 1, 2 when they have a 3, and 1 when they have a 2. They
would end up trading probability of obtaining items that they value more for probability
of obtaining items that they value less. This is easy to see here, and extends to other
sorts of problems. In order to have some feeling for the key to that argument, note that
it hinges on the fact that the decision that we are trying to implement is ex ante eÆcient
and so in this problem is giving higher probabilities on items that are valued more highly.
Having establishing that an agent does not want to permute announcements of his or her
valuations, we have essentially shown that the agent wants to announce truthfully up to
the constraint, and so we have a best reply of this form. There are a few details to be
taken care of, but this is the essence of showing that there is a truthful equilibrium.
Again, as we increase the number of problems linked together we will converge to
reaching full ex ante eÆciency, as the proportion of problems where there are non-truthful
announcements will go to 0.
While we have outlined why there exists an \approximately truthful" equilibrium of
the linking mechanism, we might feel better if all equilibria of this linking mechanismmust
be approximately truthful. In fact, we can show that all equilibria of this mechanism must
lead to the same utility, and for this case that means they must all be approximately
truthful. Rather than provide that argument in the context of this example, let us
consider another example. There are two reasons for doing this. The rst is that another
example will further illustrate the breadth of coverage of our approach. The second is
that the argument tying down all equilibria of the linking mechanism turns out to be
dierent if there are two agents from when there are three or more. Let us start with the
simpler intuition that underlies the two agent case. We return to discuss the uniqueness
claim for three or more agent case in more detail after proving the main theorem.
Example 3 A Public Goods Example
Consider a decision by a society of n agents of whether or not to build a public
project. The project costs c > 0. Agents have values for the public good that fall
in the set f0; 1; : : : ; mg, and are denoted v
i
. Let v denote the vector of values. For
simplicity, assume that each valuation occurs with equal probability and is independent
across agents.
We would like to build the public good when
P
i
v
i
> c and not otherwise. Moreover,
we would like to split the costs among the agents in a way so that no agent's share of
the cost exceeds their valuation. So, each agent will pay a cost share c
i
(v) such that
c
i
(v)  v
i
, and
P
i
c
i
(v) = c when
P
i
v
i
> c, and c
i
(v) = 0 otherwise.
While our decision problem in terms of building the public project is a binary one,
the decision in terms of allocating costs is more complex and so the number of outcomes
is potentially quite large.
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The desired decision rule that we have described will in generally not be incentive
compatible. To see this is quite straightforward. For instance, take the simple case where
n = 3, m = 1 and c < 1. Here, if at least one agent has v
i
= 1, then we build the project
and split the costs equally among those having v
i
= 1. Consider an agent who has a
valuation of v
i
= 1. By pretending to have v
i
= 0 that agent will still enjoy the public
project with probability
3
4
, but save on paying the cost. This comes at some risk, as
pretending to have v
i
= 0 may result in not having the project built if it turns out that
both of the other agents have a valuation of 0, which happens with probability
1
4
. In
particular the overall expected cost savings is
7
12
c weighed against the
1
4
probability of
losing the public good which is of value 1 to the agent. This results in a net change
in expected utility from lying of
7
12
c  
1
4
. Thus, if c >
3
7
, then this decision rule is not
incentive compatible.
If the society is faced with making several such decisions, then we can link the decisions
by requiring that agents announce values across the dierent problems that approximate
the frequency distribution. As the number of such linked decisions increases, we will
converge to the rst best eÆcient solution on each of them.
Example 4 A Bargaining Problem
This example is paradigmatic for bargaining (or bilateral monopoly) with uncertainty.
A buyer and a seller must decide whether or not a good will be transferred from the seller
to the buyer and what price will be paid by the buyer in the case of a transfer. There is
uncertainty and the utilities are specied as follows: with probability
2
3
the seller values
the object at 0 and with probability
1
3
she values the object at 8. With probability
2
3
the
buyer values the object at 10 and with probability
1
3
he values the object at 2. Assume
further that these valuations are independent.
It is fundamental since Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) that there is no solution
to this problem that is ex post individually rational, incentive compatible, and Pareto
eÆcient. The following \second-best" mechanism maximizes the sum of the utilities
subject to the constraints of individual rationality and incentive compatibility. When a
0-valued seller meets a 10-valued buyer exchange takes place at a price of 5. When an
8-valued seller meets a 10-valued buyer exchange takes place at a price of 8 only
5
7
of the
time; and
2
7
of the time there is no exchange. Similarly, when a 0 meets a 2 exchange
takes place at a price of 2 only
5
7
of the time. If an 8 meets a 2, then there is no exchange.
The eÆciency loss of this mechanism is associated with the times when an 8 meets a 10
or 0 meets a 2 and no exchange takes place.
Second Best Mechanism
Buyer's Value
10 2
Seller's 0 Trade Prob = 1;Price = 5 Trade Prob =
5
7
;Price = 2
Value 8 Trade Prob =
5
7
;Price = 8 NoTrade
10
Now, let us consider a buyer and seller who are bargaining over some number m of
objects and in a situation where valuations are independent across items and agents.
For simplicity, let us take m to be divisible by 3. In the same spirit as the previous
examples, require each agent to specify the 2m/3 times that he or she is \eager" to
trade (corresponding to the valuations 0 or a 10), and the m=3 times that he or she is
\reluctant" to trade.
But now, remove the probability of
5
7
on the trades when eager and reluctant agents
meet, so that trade happens with probability 1. So this is an ex ante eÆcient mecha-
nism, provided the incentives are right for agents to announce their types approximately
truthfully.
Ex Ante EÆcient Mechanism
Buyer's Value
10 2
Seller's 0 Trade Prob = 1;Price = 5 Trade Prob = 1;Price = 2
Value 8 Trade Prob = 1;Price = 8 NoTrade
Again, by the previous argument there is an \approximately truthful" equilibrium
of the linked mechanism where agents are constrained to announce their valuations in
proportion to the true distribution. And as argued before, we again have that this
converges to full eÆciency as the number of linked mechanisms increases.
But let us add a further argument that all equilibria must lead to the same limit
utility. Consider the seller. Suppose that the seller follows a strategy of announcing
approximately truthfully in the following way: if she has at least 2m=3 valuations of
0, then announce all of the valuations of 8 truthfully and randomly pick some surplus
valuations of 0 to be announced as 8's; if she has fewer than 2m=3 valuations of 0, then
announce all of the valuations of 0 truthfully and randomly pick some 8's to announce
as 0's so as to meet the 2m=3 constraint.
Note that by using this strategy, regardless of what the buyer does, in the limit the
seller will obtain their full ex ante expected utility under the eÆcient mechanism. That
follows because even if the buyer follows a strategy that depends on the labels of the
problems, the buyer must report the correct distribution. If the seller is announcing
approximately truthfully in the manner described above, then the seller and buyer's
announcements are independent. Eectively, the seller has a strategy that guarantees
her the ex ante eÆcient limiting payo. Thus, any sequence of equilibrium strategies for
the seller must lead to the same limiting payo for her. By a similar argument the same
is true for the buyer. Thus, each player must get at least their ex ante expected payo in
any sequence of equilibria of the linking mechanisms. By the ex ante eÆciency of these
payos, it cannot be that either agent gets more. Thus all sequences of equilibria of the
linking mechanism have the same ex ante limiting payo.
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Note that in the context of this example, as players are never indierent, this argument
actually also ties down the strategies in the limit to be approximately truthful.
Extending this uniqueness argument to more than two players requires an important
but very natural modication of the linking mechanisms, as we discuss below.
We should point out that in the context of this example we have cheated a bit in
showing that our linking mechanism leads to improvements. To be specic, we have not
held our linking mechanism to satisfy the ex post individual rationality constraint except
in the limit. So while it does show that we can get closer to satisfying that constraint
through linking mechanisms together, taking individual rationality seriously means that
we might want to impose it on all of the linked problems as well. We shall come back to
show that in fact we can reach the same conclusions even if we hold to the full ex post
rationality constraint (that is even holding item by item) for any sized linking mechanism.
3 A General Theorem on Linking Decisions
We now provide a theorem on linking decisions that show that eÆciency gains can be
made by linking any decision problems with any number of agents.
Let us rst provide some denitions.
The Agents
Consider n agents who are involved in making decisions.
Decision Problems
A decision problem is a triple D = (D;U; P ).
Here D is a nite set of possible alternative decisions; U = U
1
  U
n
is a nite set of
possible proles of utility functions (u
1
; : : : ; u
n
), where u
i
: D ! IR; and P = (P
1
; : : : ; P
n
)
is a prole of probability distributions, where P
i
is a distribution over U
i
.
The niteness of the decision problems is assumed for ease of exposition as it provides
for fairly clean and intuitive proofs. One way to extend the results to more general settings
is directly through nite approximations.
We take the u
i
's to be drawn independently across agents. This makes achieving
eÆcient decisions more diÆcult, as we know that correlation can help in designing incen-
tive compatible and eÆcient mechanisms (for instance, as shown by Cremer and McLean
(1988)). Thus, by considering cases with complete independence, we can be sure that our
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eÆciency results are not obtained by learning something about one agent's type through
the reports of others.
We abuse notation and write P (u) for the probability of u.
Social Choice Functions
A social choice function on a social decision problem D = (D;U; P ) is a function
f : U ! (D), where () denotes the set of probability distributions on a given set.
We allow f 's to randomize over decisions since such randomizations admit tie-breaking
rules that are natural in the problems we have already discussed, among others.
The notation f(u)[d] denotes the probability of choosing d 2 D given the prole of
utility functions u 2 U .
Pareto EÆciency
A social choice function f on a decision problem D = (D;U; P ) is ex ante Pareto
eÆcient if there does not exist any social choice function f
0
on D = (D;U; P ) such that
X
u
P (u)
X
d
f
0
(u)[d]u
i
(d) 
X
u
P (u)
X
d
f(u)[d]u
i
(d)
for all i with strict inequality for some i.
This is simply the standard denition of ex ante Pareto eÆciency, and implies the
standard interim (conditional on each u
i
) and ex post versions (conditional on each u)
as well.
Linking Mechanisms
Given a decision problem D = (D;U; P ) and a number K of times that it is to be
linked, a linking mechanism (M;
b
f) is a message space M = M
1
     M
n
and an
outcome function
b
f :M ! (D
K
).
A linking mechanism is simply a mechanism that works on a set of decision problems
all at once, making the decisions contingent on the preferences over all the decisions
rather than handling each decision in isolation.
We let
b
f
k
(m) denote the marginal distribution under
b
f onto the k-th decision if the
messages m 2M are selected by the agents.
Preferences over Linked Decisions
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When we link K versions of a decision problem D = (D;U; P ), an agent's utility over
a set of decisions is simply the sum of utilities. So, the utility that agent i gets from
decisions (d
1
; : : : ; d
K
) 2 D
K
given preferences (u
1
i
; : : : ; u
K
i
) 2 U
K
i
is given by
P
k
u
k
i
(d
k
).
We assume that the randomness is independent across decision problems. Thus,
there are no complementarities either in preferences or correlation across the decision
problems. The complete lack of interaction between problems makes the gains from
linking more diÆcult and really drives home the point that the eÆciency gains we obtain
are coming from being able to trade decisions o against each other to uncover intensities
of preferences, and the gains are not due to any correlation or complementarities.
Strategies and Equilibrium
A strategy for a player in a linking mechanism (M;
b
f) on K copies of a decision
problem D = (D;U; P ) is a mapping 
i
: U
K
i
! (M
i
).
We consider Bayesian equilibria of such mechanisms.
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Approximating EÆcient Decisions through Linking
Given a decision problem D = (D;U; P ) and a social choice function f dened on D,
we say that a sequence of linking mechanisms dened on dened on increasing numbers
of linked problems, f(M
1
;
b
f
1
); (M
2
;
b
f
2
); : : : ; (M
k
;
b
f
k
); : : :g, approximates f if there exists
a corresponding sequence of Bayesian equilibrium f
k
g such that
8
lim
k
h
max
k
0
k
E
h



b
f
k
k
0
(
k
)  f(u
k
0
)



ii
= 0:
Thus, a sequence of equilibria and linking mechanisms approximates a social choice
function if for large enough linkings of the problems the equilibrium outcomes linking
mechanism result in nearly the same decisions on all problems as the desired social choice
function. We emphasize that being close on all problems is much stronger than having
the average be close.
A Theorem on Approximating EÆcient Decisions through Linking
We are now ready to present the main theorem. It is useful to rst give a description
of the mechanism that is used for the theorem. The basic ideas behind its structure have
been outlined in the examples, and the linking mechanisms can be described as follows.
Each agent announces utility functions for the k problems. So this is like a direct
revelation mechanism. However, the agent's announcements across the k problems must
7
We omit this standard denition.
8
Note that mechanisms are distributions over nite set of decisions, and so distance between them is
computed by viewing them as vectors.
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match the expected frequency distribution. That is, the number of times that i can (and
must) announce a given utility function u
i
is approximately k  P
i
(u
i
).
9
The choice is
then made according to desired f based on the announcements.
The constraint of announcing a distribution of utility functions that approximates
P
i
will sometimes force an agent to lie about their utility functions on some problems,
as just by chance their realizations of utility functions across problems may not match
P
i
. Nevertheless, the agent will still have strategies that are \approximately" truthful
in a well-dened sense. To be precise, let us say that an agent follows a strategy that is
approximately truthful if the agent's announcements are always such that they involve as
few lies as possible. That is, a strategy is approximately truthful if for any realization
the number of problems on which the agent's announced utility function and true utility
function dier is minimized.
As we shall see, there always exists an equilibrium which involves such approximately
truthful strategies. Moreover, such approximately truthful strategies are actually secure
strategies in that they guarantee the agent the ex ante eÆcient expected utility! This
implies that all equilibria of the mechanism must converge to providing the same expected
utility.
Theorem 5 Consider a decision problem D and an ex ante Pareto eÆcient social choice
function f dened on it. There exists a sequence of linking mechanisms on linked versions
of the decision problem and corresponding (\approximately-truthful") Bayesian equilibria
that approximate f . Moreover, all sequences of Bayesian equilibria of the linking mech-
anisms converge to provide the same limiting expected utility per problem to all agents
as they would obtain from truthful revelation under f on all problems. Furthermore, by
following any approximately truthful strategy, an agent obtains his or her limiting ex ante
eÆcient expected utility (as calculated under f) on each problem, regardless of the other
agent's strategies.
There is an important modication to the mechanism that is needed to ensure that
all equilibria converge to the same limit when there are three or more agents. To see why
we need such a modication, and what it should be, consider the following example.
Example 6 Eliminating Collusive Equilibria
Consider the following three-person example.
Two decisions are possible, D = fa; bg. As in Example 1 we represent utilities in
terms of the dierence of utilities, v
i
= v
i
(b)   v
i
(a). Agent 1 always has v
1
=  3. So
agent 1 is always in favor of decision a. Agents 2 and 3 are always in favor of decision b,
9
With a nite set of problems k, the frequency of announcements cannot exactly match P
i
, unless
P
i
(u
i
) happens to be a fraction of k for each possible u
i
2 U
i
, and so we approximate P
i
, as described
in the appendix.
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but their utilities can each independently take on two possible values U
2
= U
3
= f1; 3g,
each with probability 1/2.
The solution we would like to implement in the utilitarian one where we choose
decision a if v
2
= v
3
= 1 and otherwise we choose decision b.
Consider the linking mechanism over m linked versions of this problem, as we have
described it in the previous examples. Agents 2 and 3 must each announce
m
2
valuations
of 1 and
m
2
valuations of 3 over the m linked problems.
Agent 1's announcement is always -3 for all problems, and so we can ignore it. As
we have argued before, there is an approximately truthful equilibrium of the mechanism
that results in our desired decisions with increasing probability as m becomes large.
However, note that in this example there is also another \collusive" equilibrium which
does not result in our desired decision, and which involves coordination between agents
2 and 3. It is as follows. Have agent 2 announce v
2
= 1 on the even indexed problems
and v
2
= 3 on the odd problems. Have agent 3 announce v
3
= 3 on the even problems
and v
3
= 1 on the odd problems. This results in decision a being chosen on all problems!
This is the best possible outcome for agents 2 and 3 and is clearly an equilibrium, but is
not the utilitarian outcome that we desired.
So, how can we modify our basic linking mechanism to eliminate this bad equilibrium
(and all other undesired ones) in a simple way and without altering its nice eÆciency
properties? Here is such a simple and natural approach. If we were running the mech-
anism and we saw a sequence of announcements from agents 2 and 3 where their total
valuation turned out to be 3+1=4 on so many of the problems, we would think it highly
likely that this was not by accident but that the agents had coordinated their strategies.
What we can do is check agents' announcements to see if they appear as if they match
the joint distribution that would ensue under truth. If we nd some agents whose joint
announcements appear to be \too far from truth", then we will simply ignore their an-
nouncements and randomly pick an announcement for them. We will occasionally make
mistakes in doing this, but with a judicial choice of how to dene \too far from truth",
when can keep the probability of this happening to a minimum and have this go to 0
in the limit. The full description of the modied mechanism appears in the proof, and
indeed it gets rid of all the undesired equilibria.
Note that the reason that such a modication is not needed with just two agents, is
that under an ex ante eÆcient f , the mechanism results in a game that is essentially a
strictly competitive one and so no collusion is possible.
4 Remarks and Discussion
Let us make a few remarks about the mechanism and the theorem's coverage.
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Rationalizability
The fact that any approximately truthful strategy secures an agent an expected utility
that is approaching the ex ante eÆcient one, has some nice implications for the solvability
of the game. We do not need to resort to Bayesian equilibrium or worry about player's
beliefs about what strategies other players will play. The fact that they can secure a given
payo
10
by following (any) approximately truthful strategy means that any rationalizable
prole of strategies must lead to at least these secured payos.
Strong Equilibrium
The fact that agents can secure payos with any approximately truthful strategy, also
has interesting implications for the impossibility of improving through joint deviations.
If each agent is playing an approximately truthful strategy, then the possible gain that
might result from a joint deviation by some group of players is bounded, as the remaining
players' utilities are secured regardless of the group's deviation. In fact, the structure of
the mechanism that rules out collusion makes this true regardless of whether players are
playing approximately truthful or not. While this does not imply that any equilibrium
is a strong equilibrium, it does imply that the gains from coalitional deviations will be
limited and approaching 0 in the limit.
Outcomes and Utilities
While the theorem states that all equilibria lead to the same limiting utilities, and
we know that the approximately truthful equilibria lead to the right limiting outcomes;
we might want the even stronger conclusion that all equilibria lead to the same limiting
outcomes. There are two things to say on this. One is that for many problems, tying
down the ex ante expected utilities does in fact tie down the outcomes. The other remark
is that in cases where tying down the utilities does not tie down the outcomes, the reason
we might care is that some other party has preferences over outcomes (for instance a cost
of providing a good). If this is the case, then we can add that party to our setting and
dene the ex ante eÆcient rule accounting for their preferences too and then apply the
theorem.
Heterogeneity in Problems
et us re-emphasize that the decision problems considered in Theorem 5 are completely
arbitrary and so the coverage is quite general. This means that regardless of the nature
10
By secure we mean that the player gets at least that payo regardless of the strategies of the other
players. The game here is referring to the choice of 
i
's by players as the strategy space and calculating
payos from an expected utility point of view. Rationalizability is as dened by Bernheim (1984) and
Pearce (1984).
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of the problems and the reasons that eÆciency might not be incentive compatible in
isolated problems, linking the decisions together can improve. We have assumed that the
decision problem being linked is the same in all cases. However, even if we have several
dierent problems, linking them is still advantageous, provided we obtain replications
of each problem. It may be that one problem is a binary decision, while another is a
bargaining problem, while another is a public good problem with transferable utility.
Linking enough of these together will lead to eÆciency gains.
Moreover, one can see that we could get some partial improvements even in cases
where the problems are all dierent, but have some relationship to each other. For
instance, consider the case where there is a single seller who is bargaining with many
dierent buyers. Each buyer is buying only one good, but the seller is selling many
goods. Even though we cannot link the buyers' announcements, we can still link the
seller's announcements to ensure approximate truth on her side. That will still lead to
some improvements.
Large Numbers Reasoning
It is important to emphasize that the intuition behind the results here is quite dis-
tinct from other large numbers implementation theorems. That is, we know from the
previous literature that increasing numbers of agents can, in certain circumstances, lead
to increased competition and to eÆcient outcomes. Essentially the intuition there is that
in the limit individual agents become negligible in terms of their impact on things like
prices, so their incentives to try to manipulate the outcome to their advantage disap-
pears.
11
In our linking of decisions the reasoning behind the gains in eÆciency is quite
dierent. Given that there is a xed number of agents, they are not becoming negligible.
In fact, they each hold substantial private information in terms of their overall ability
to inuence outcomes.
12
The key is that linking has helped us by giving a richer set of
decision problems to trade-o against each other to help discover agents' preferences.
How Large is Large?
We can put a bound on the number of problems where any mistake will be made in
the linking mechanism we have proposed here. The bound comes from what is known
of laws of large numbers, such as a very useful theorem due to Kolmogorov.
13
Here it
implies that the proportion of problems out of K on which agents might be forced to lie
is of the order of
1
p
K
. As we know that the secure strategies of approximate truth have
lies that are then bounded by this, we obtain a crude upper bound on the distance from
full optimality. It can be at most on the order of
1
p
K
in terms of percentage distance
from full ex ante eÆciency.
11
See, for instance Roberts and Postlewaite (1973) and the literature that followed.
12
Thus, they are not informationally small in the sense of McLean and Postlewaite (2002).
13
See (13.4) in Billingsley (1968).
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In many problems it is in fact closer. To get some feeling for this, let us consider a
very simple example. Consider an object to be allocated to one of two agents (a simplied
version of Example2). Each agent has a valuation for the object of either 1 or 10, with
equal probability, with independent draws. An eÆcient decision is to give the object to
an agent with valuation of 10 if such an agent exists, and to either agent if both have
valuations of 1. To be symmetric, ip a coin if both agents have a value of 10 or both
have a value of 1. This results in an ex ante expected utility per agent of 3.875. Without
any linking and subject to incentive constraints, the best we can do is to ip a coin and
randomly assign the object. This results in an expected utility of 2.750.
We can also consider linking such decisions together. The following table provides
the expected utility as a function of the number of the linked decisions.
14
Number of Linked Problems: 1 2 4 6 limit
Expected Utility Per Problem: 2.750 3.594 3.752 3.843 3.875
Other Desired Conditions: Individual Rationality
Due to the fact that the f 's can be any ex ante eÆcient mechanism that we desire, we
can also satisfy whatever auxiliary properties we would like, such as individual rationality,
fairness, etc. Moreover, in some cases we might want require that these conditions hold
all along the sequence, and not just in the limit. This is quite natural for instance in the
case of participation constraints such as individual rationality, and can be accommodated
here.
As mentioned at the end of Example 4, the linking mechanism we described did not
respect the individual rationality constraint except in the limit. Let us point out that in
fact this is easily rectied. Let us run the linking mechanism, except for a change that
we allow agents to walk away from any given problem if they do not like the outcome
and then there is no trade (or some other status quo). This will guarantee that the
outcome on every problem will be individually rational (from any time perspective).
Agents will walk away on occasion under the linking mechanism, given that they are
articially constrained in the frequency distribution of their types and so even if f is
individually rational the outcome might not always be so. However, which problems
that the seller would like to walk away from is not predictable by the buyer nor vice
versa. This means that allowing players to veto the outcome of the mechanism to respect
14
The calculations here are for the \best" linking mechanism { one that minimizes the total number
of misallocations subject to incentive constraints. In this example it is a variation on our previously
described mechanism, where the mechanism helps in deciding where agents announce 10's if they have
too few or too many compared to what they are allowed to announce. This actually corresponds to the
choosing the best allocation subject to giving each agent half of the objects. Our previously described
linking mechanism does slightly worse than this one. We use the best linking mechanism only because
it simplies the calculations for this table, and with 6 linked decisions there are already 4096 utility
proles to worry about.
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individual rationality, makes no dierence in the incentives across problems. Thus, the
claims about our linking mechanisms still hold even if we allow agents to walk away. In
fact, as we link more problems, the fraction of problems where some agent walks goes
to 0. Thus, all along the sequence we can also have individual rationality hold and still
have our results be true.
It is very important to note that this logic extends more generally, and is not limited
to the bargaining example. Individual rationality can be added to the main theorem itself
in the same way. For instance in our public goods example, we can force no production
any time some agent decides to walk away. This will occur in a vanishing fraction of the
problems.
Correlation across Problems
When linking problems together what is the optimal mix of problems? Should we
pick problems that are somehow related, or ones that are not? Thus far, we have focussed
on the case of independent types. We know from the mechanism design literature that
having some correlation across agents can often help in designing mechanisms, especially
in situations where large rewards and penalties are possible and no ex post individual
rationality constraints are imposed (e.g., Cremer and McLean (198?)). The idea is that
we can use one agent's announcement to get some information about what the other
agent should be saying and thus to design incentives.
Here, the linking of decisions has helped even in the complete absence of any correla-
tion either across problems or across agents. Thus, the intuition for why linking decisions
together helps improve things has nothing to do with correlation in information being
exploited. As discussed above, the intuition instead stems from the ability to learn about
intensities of preferences by exploiting tradeos across problems. Nevertheless, it can still
be that some forms of correlation make tradeos more or less likely, and thus more or
less useful. So, let us explore this in a bit more detail.
Let us rst ask the question about correlation of each given agent's preferences across
problems, while maintaining independence across agents. Two simple things are apparent
and give us some idea of what we should expect. First, if the problems are perfectly
positively correlated, then there is no benet to linking. Eectively, the second problem
is an exact copy of the realization of the rst problem and so no tradeos across the two
problems are possible. So, it is clear that this is a worst-case scenario. On the other hand,
perfect negative correlation { at least in terms of intensities { is the opposite extreme
and the best possible scenario.
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To see this, note that if we know that an agent cares
intensely for one problem, then they will not care intensely for the other problem. Then
we can ask an agent to declare which of the two problems they care more for, and there
will be no diÆculties at all { full eÆciency can be attained.
15
Perfect negative correlation in terms of intensities is a bit peculiar in terms of the overall distribution
over values.
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Looking at these two extremes suggests that there may be some sort of monotonicity
in terms of the correlation structure. The following simple example shows this to be true.
Consider a variation on the two decision example presented above. First, let us draw
agents' values on the rst problem to be i.i.d. with equal probabilities on f 2; 1; 1; 2g.
Next, we draw agent i's value for the second problem, v
i2
to be the same as for rst
problem, v
i1
, with probability  2 [0; 1], and to be independent of the valuation for rst
problem with probability 1  .
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Now let us compare running separate voting mechanisms to running the linked mech-
anism where agents vote and also declare which problem they care more about or say that
they are indierent. Let us calculate the probability that a mistake is made under these
two types of mechanisms. This is the probability that agents care in opposite directions
on a given problem and with dierent intensities and a decision is made in favor of an
agent who cares less about that problem.
Under separate voting mechanisms, the correlation pattern is irrelevant, and the
chance that such an error occurs is 1/2, conditional on agents caring in opposite directions
and with dierent intensities. This situation arises 1/4 of the time and so the total
probability of such an error is 1/8.
Under the linked mechanism, again the probability of this situation occurring is 1/4.
However, the chance that there is an error conditional on this situation arising is the
1/2 times the probability (conditional on this situation) that the two agents have both
announced \I care equally about the two problems".
17
The probability that this happens
is
[ +
1  
2
]
2
=
(1 + )
2
4
:
Thus, the overall probability of an error in this case is
(1 + )
2
32
:
When  = 0 this probability is minimized at
1
32
, and if  = 1 then this probability is
maximized at
1
8
. Thus, the more positively correlated the valuations, the closer the linked
mechanism is to just running separate mechanisms. The largest improvement comes from
having independent values across the two problems.
This particular example does not allow for negative correlation, as things are either
positively related or independent.
16
This distribution is nicely symmetric and can also be described as picking the second problem
valuations rst and then drawing the rst problem valuations in the manner described above.
17
Note that in this situation they will not have both named the same problem { they will either have
named dierent problems or had at least one announce \equal". The only potential error comes in when
they both announced equality across problems.
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Let us consider another example where the correlation allows for a negative relation-
ship between intensities.
The structure is parameterized by  2 [ 1; 1]. Things are independent across agents.
For a given agent i, we pick v
i1
with equal probability on f 2; 1; 1; 2g. Next, we pick
v
i2
as follows. We rst pick its sign. We do this in any manner so long as the marginal on
positive and negative remains the same as the original distribution (equal probabilities).
The correlation in signs will not matter in any way. Next, we pick the intensity of v
i2
.
We pick v
i2
to have the same intensity as v
i1
with probability
1+
2
and with the remaining
probability of
1 
2
it is chosen to have a dierent intensity.
Here, it is easily seen that the probability of an error is
(1 + )
2
32
:
This is minimized at  =  1. So, negative correlation in intensities reduces errors to 0
and is even better than independence.
Some Comments on Related Mechanisms
In some cases, the linking mechanisms that we have dened take forms that have other
interpretations or close cousins. For instance, in Example 2, the linking mechanisms
results in a similar limiting distribution on outcomes as the taking turns mechanism
studied by McAfee (1992). In the binary voting example, the linking mechanisms have
features of a voting system where one had votes of varying power what could be spent
on dierent problems, which is reminiscent of Casella's (2002) very innovative storable
votes mechanism, although our linking mechanisms have some important distinctions in
the way we force agents to ration their announcements to make sure that the equilibria
are limiting eÆcient.
In other problems, such as the allocation of a private good, there are alternative
mechanisms that operate in a very dierent way and can still attain eÆciency, such as
some auctions. With respect to that let us make two points. On the one hand our linking
mechanisms operate without the need for any transfers or payments. This can be very
important, especially in situations where one is not sure to whom the revenue generated
from the auction should be given. Auction revenue cannot be returned to the bidders
without contamination of the incentives (or else some loss of individual rationality).
18
On the other hand, the linking mechanisms do require a number of problems in order to
get to full eÆciency. Nevertheless, even for such private good allocation problems, the
simple lessons from the linking mechanism can still be important: linking problems will
18
As we know from d'Aspremont and Gerard-Varet (1973), there are some mechanisms that will be
eÆcient and balanced (among participants, so in this case we can make that bidders), but we also know
that such mechanisms will not satisfy even interim individual rationality constraints. One can see this
fairly generally in Ledyard and Palfrey (2003).
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enhance eÆciency, and even simple budgeting of agents' actions or type announcements
can help with incentives.
Let us close with some nal remarks on the relation to some other literature that the
linking of decisions might have brought to mind.
When thinking about voting problems and linking decisions, it is natural to think of
log-rolling.
19
Indeed there is some avor of trading across decisions that is inherent in the
linking mechanisms. However, logrolling generally has to do with some coalition (often
a minimal majority) making trades in order to control votes, and usually at the expense
of other agents. Logs are rolled in the context of majority voting mechanisms across
dierent problems, which points out the important distinction that the mechanism itself
is not designed with the linking in mind. This leads to a contrast between the benets
of linking mechanisms and the dark side of logrolling.
Finally, another place where some linking of decisions occurs is in the bundling of
goods by a monopolist. The idea that a monopolist may gain is selling goods in bun-
dles rather than in isolation is was pointed out in the classic paper by Adams and
Yellen (1976). Moreover, this gain can be realized when preferences over the goods are
independent (see McAfee, McMillan and Whinston (1979)), can be enhanced by allow-
ing for cheap talk where information about rankings of objects is communicated (see
Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2003)), and in fact in some cases the monopolist can almost
extract full surplus by bundling many goods (see Armstrong (1999)). Indeed, applying
the linking decisions to the case of a bundling monopolist we can obtain (a strengthening
of) Armstrong's result as a corollary to Theorem 5 by having the monopolist be agent
1 and the buyer be agent 2 and letting f be that the monopolist sells the good to the
buyer at the buyer's reservation price whenever the reservation value is less than the cost
of the good.
We wish to reiterate that our overall message goes beyond saying that linking de-
cision problems can help enhance eÆciency: it is also that the coverage of the linking
mechanisms is broad, applying to most any setting; and that the ideas for discovering
the preferences of agents on dierent problems by budgeting how they can act across
dierent problems and imposing trade-os can be useful and general tools for reconciling
incentives with eÆciency and other desiderata.
What Does the Mechanism Need to Know?
As with all Bayesian mechanism design problems, there is a dependence of the mech-
anisms we suggest on the distribution of types, in this case the P
i
's. How robust are the
mechanisms?
19
For some of the classics on this subject, see Tullock (196?) and Wilson (1969), as well as the
discussion in Miller (1977).
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There are two things to say here. First, the security of approximately truthful strate-
gies means that very little knowledge is required on the part of the agents. Nonetheless,
the mechanism itself still relies on the P
i
's. Changing those P
i
's will generally change
the secure payos in a continuous way, and so mispecications of the mechanism are
not as problematic as with some other Bayesian mechanisms that are more precariously
constructed.
Even beyond this, we feel that the basic ideas here still provide some important
insights into solving incentives problems. For instance, in the case of a series of binary
decisions one can simply ask agents to rank order the problems in terms of the intensity
of their preferences, and then use these rankings to help determine the outcomes. The
important message is that the linking of decisions across problems oers the possibility
of signicant gains in eÆciency. The realization of those potential gains might depend
on the extent to which the decision making problem can be tailored to the environment.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 5:
For any given k dene the k-th linking mechanism,
b
f
k
, as follows. This is the denition
for n = 2, but we will state it for n  2 as then the mechanism for n  3 is an easily
described variation.
For each i, P
i
is the marginal distribution over the nite set U
i
. Find any approxi-
mation P
k
i
to P
i
such that P
k
i
(u
i
) is a multiple of
1
k
for each u
i
2 U
i
, and the Euclidean
distance between P
k
i
and P
i
(viewed as vectors) is minimized.
The mechanism
b
f
k
is described as follows. Each agent i must announce u
k
i
's across
dierent problems in a frequency exactly equal to P
k
i
. Formally, i's strategy set is
M
k
i
= f
b
u
i
2 (U
i
)
k
s:t: #fk
0
:
b
u
k
0
i
= u
i
g = P
k
i
(u
i
) for each u
i
2 U
i
g:
The choice of
b
f
k
for the problem k
0
is f
k
0
(
b
u
k
0
), where
b
u
k
0
i
is i's announced utility
function for problem k
0
under the realized announcement m =
b
u.
The modication of the mechanism for more than two players is as follows.
For some j, m
k
j
=
b
u
j
2 M
k
j
announced on linking mechanism
b
f
k
, and set of dates
T  f1; : : : ; kg, let 
k
j
(
b
u
j
; T ) be the frequency distribution of announced types by j
on dates in T . Thus, this is a distribution on U
j
conditional on looking only at the
announcements made on dates T .
For any k, agent i, and announced vector of
b
u and any k consider the following
measure:
d
k
i
(
b
u) max
j 6=i;u
i
jP
k
j
  
k
j
(
b
u
j
; ftj
b
u
i
= u
i
g)
If this measure is close to 0, then it means that the agents are not correlating their
announcements. If it diers signicantly from 0, then i is correlating announcements
with some other agent. That is, this measure looks at the conditional distribution of the
announced u
j
's conditional on the dates that i announced some u
i
and checks whether it
is close to what the empirical distribution should be. It does this across all agents j 6= i
and all announcements of i.
Let us say that a strategy 
i
for i is label-free if i's strategy depends only on the prole
of utility functions and not the labels of the problems. That is, if we permute which
utility functions i has on the problems, then we end up simply permuting i's strategy
in a corresponding manner. Formally, Given a permutation (bijection)  : f1; : : : ; kg !
f1; : : : ; kg, let u

i
be dened by u
;k
0
i
= u

i
(k
0
) for each k
0
2 f1; : : : ; kg. So we have just
reshued the utility functions that i has under u
i
on the dierent problems according
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to . Given our denition of M
k
i
there is a corresponding notion of m

i
starting from
any m
i
2 M
k
i
. Let us say that a strategy 
i
for i is label-free if for any permutation
 : f1; : : : ; kg ! f1; : : : ; kg 
i
(u

i
)[m

i
] = 
i
(u
i
)[m
i
], where 
i
(u
i
)[m
i
] is the probability
of playing m
i
at u
i
under 
i
.
By a strong law of large numbers of distribution, such as the Glivenko-Cantelli The-
orem (see Billingsley (1968)), we can nd "
k
! 0, such that if agents are following
strategies that are label-free, then the probability that max
i
[d
k
i
(
b
u)] > "
k
goes to 0.
Modify the mechanism
b
f
k
as follows. For any i and announced m =
b
u such that
d
k
i
(
b
u) > "
k
, instead of using
b
u
i
, generate a random vector
e
u
i
according to P
k
i
and for each
such i substitute
e
u
i
for
b
u
i
in determining the outcome.
Now, with a formal description of the mechanism in place, let us start by proving the
second part of the theorem: that all sequences of equilibria converge to the same utilities.
Consider the following \approximately truthful" strategy 

i
. Consider a realized
u
i
2 U
k
i
. For any v
i
2 U
i
with frequency less than P
k
i
(v
i
) in the vector u
i
, announce
truthfully on all problems k
0
such that u
k
0
i
= v
i
. For other v
i
's, randomly pick kP
k
i
(v
i
) of
the problems k
0
such that u
k
0
i
= v
i
to announce truthfully on. On the remaining problems
randomly pick announcements to satisfy the constraints imposed by P
k
i
under M
k
i
. By
using 

i
agent guarantees him or herself an expected utility per problem approaching
the utility that comes under truth-telling by all agents, regardless of the strategy of the
other agents, as the agent is guaranteed that the distribution over other agents' types are
approximately independently distributed and approximately what should be expected if
the other agents were truthful (regardless of whether they are). Let u
i
be that utility
level. As every agent can be obtain a limiting expected utility per problem of at least
u
i
, regardless of the other agents strategies, by following the \approximately truthful"
strategy 

i
, then it must that the lim inf of each agent's expected utility per problem
along any sequence of equilibria is at least u
i
. However, notice that by ex ante eÆciency
of f , for any prole of strategies, and any k, if some i is expecting a utility higher than
u
i
, then some j must be expecting a utility of less than u
j
. This implies that since the
lim inf of each agent's expected utility for any sequence of equilibria is u
i
, it must also be
that this is the limit of the expected utility of each agent, which is the desired conclusion.
To conclude the proof, let us show that there exists an \approximately truthful"
Bayesian equilibrium of the linking mechanism such that the sequence of linking mecha-
nisms and these corresponding equilibria approximate f .
To do this, we need a further modication of the mechanism. For a given k, the
distribution P
k
i
may not exactly match P
i
. In order to make sure that for an arbitrary
decision problem we always have an approximately truthful equilibrium, we need to be
sure that the distributions far enough along the sequence exactly match P
i
and not
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just approximately.
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Any easy modication of the linking mechanisms ensure this.
Find a smallest possible 
k
such that there exists another distribution
e
P
k
i
such that
(1  
k
)P
k
i
+ 
k
e
P
k
i
= P
i
(again noting that these can be written as vectors). Note that

k
! 0.
Now, on any given problem k
0
let the mechanism
b
f
k
follow i's announced
b
u
k
0
i
with
probability (1 
k
) and randomly draw an announcement to replace this with probability

k
according to
e
P
k
i
, and do this independently across problems and agents. This means
that the distribution of any i's announcements that are used by the mechanism across
problems will be exactly P
i
.
Now, note that under this modication, all of our previous arguments still hold.
Consider any agent i. If all agents j 6= i play label-free strategies, then given the
denition of the strategy spaces M
j
and the independence across problems, the distribu-
tion of the announcements of agents j 6= i on any problem is given by P
 i
, and this is
i.i.d. across problems. Thus, for any best response that i has to label-free strategies of
the other players, there will in fact be a label-free best response for i.
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Note also that
any best response to some label-free strategies of other players is a best response to any
label-free strategies of the other players. Given the nite nature of the game, for any
set of label-free strategies of players  i there exists a best response for player i, and, as
argued above, one that is label-free. Thus there exists a label-free equilibrium.
Next, let us show that that there exists such an equilibrium that is approximately
truthful in the sense that i never permutes the announcements of her true utility functions
across some set of problems. Note that this together with the denition of M
k
i
imply
that as k becomes large the proportion of problems where i announces truthfully will
approach one in probability. This again follows from distribution based versions of the
strong law of large numbers such as the Glivenko-Cantelli Theorem, and will conclude
proof of the theorem.
More formally, consider i's label-free equilibrium strategy 
i
. Consider some m
i
=
b
u
i
such that 
i
(u
i
)[m
i
] > 0. Suppose that there is some subset of problems K  f1; : : : ; kg
such that i is permuting announcements on K. That is there exists a permutation
 : K ! K such that (k
0
) 6= k
0
and
b
u
k
0
i
= u
(k
0
)
i
for all k
0
2 K. So i's announcement
under m
i
reshues the true utility functions that i has under u
i
on the problems K
according to .
Dene
f
m
i
where this permutation on K is undone. That is,
f
m
k
0
i
= u
k
0
i
for each k
0
2 K
and
f
m
k
0
i
= m
k
0
i
for each k
0
=2 K. Then consider an alternative strategy (that will still be
20
For some decision problems, this could turn out to make a dierence. The reason is that it might be
that f is ex ante eÆcient for the given P
i
, but not for some approximations of it. This ex ante eÆciency
of f relative to an agent's expectations plays a role in obtaining an approximately truthful equilibrium.
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Starting with any best response that is label dependent, any variation based on permuting the
dependence on labels will also be a best response, as will a convex combination of such permutations
which is label-free.
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label-free) denoted
e

i
which diers from 
i
only at u
i
and then sets
e

i
(u
i
)[m
i
] = 0 and
e

i
(u
i
)[
f
m
i
] = 
i
(u
i
)[
f
m
i
] + 
i
(u
i
)[ m
i
].
The claim is that
e

i
leads to at least as high an expected utility as 
i
. This follows from
the ex ante eÆciency of f . To see this note that the distribution of announcements under
either strategy together with the strategies of the other agents is P on all problems and
is independent across all problems (given the label-free nature of the strategies). Thus,
the other agents' ex ante expected utilities on any given problem are not aected by the
change in strategies. If i's utility were to fall as a result of using
e

i
instead of 
i
, then
it would that f could be improved upon by a corresponding change of outcomes as a
function of i's utilities. This would contradict the ex ante eÆciency of f .
Now we can continue to undo such permutations until we have reached a label-free
strategy which has no such permutations. This is the \approximately truthful" strategy
which we sought, and is still provides at least the utility of 
i
, so is still a best response,
and since it is label-free it follows that the overall equilibrium is still preserved. Iterating
on agents, leads to the desired strategy.
Strategy-Proofness
We have shown that linking mechanisms can make improvements when we are dis-
cussing Bayesian incentive compatibility - and in the proof of the limiting theorem we use
a law of large numbers. As we now show, improvements are also possible when working
with strategy-proofness (dominant strategy incentive compatibility).
[Insert denition of strategy-proof.]
Theorem 7 Consider two decision problems D
1
;D
2
and corresponding strategy-proof
mechanisms f
1
; f
2
, where each u
k
i
2 U
k
for each i and k is a strict preference over
D
k
. If [f
1
; f
2
] is not ex post eÆcient viewed as linked mechanism, then there exists
a linked mechanism that Pareto dominates [f
1
; f
2
] (from all time perspectives) and is
strategy-proof.
We remark that theorem applies to [f
1
; f
2
] which are ex post Pareto eÆcient when
viewed separately, as long as they are not ex post eÆcient viewed as linked mechanism.
Proof of Theorem 7: Find some prole of utility functions u
1
; u
2
and d
1
; d
2
, where
[f
1
(u
1
); f
2
(u
2
)] is Pareto dominated by d
1
; d
2
.
For any 1 > " > 0, dene
b
f
"
as follows. At any
b
u
1
;
b
u
2
Let
b
f
"
(
b
u
1
;
b
u
2
) be a lottery with
weight (1 ") on [f
1
(
b
u
1
); f
2
(
b
u
2
)] and " on d
1
; d
2
if d
1
; d
2
Pareto dominates [f
1
(
b
u
1
); f
2
(
b
u
2
)]
at
b
u
1
;
b
u
2
; and let
b
f
"
(
b
u
1
;
b
u
2
) be [f
1
(
b
u
1
); f
2
(
b
u
2
)] otherwise. It is clear from construction
that
b
f
"
strictly Pareto dominates f
1
; f
2
from each time perspective. So, let us check that
for small enough ",
b
f
"
is strategy-proof.
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Consider some i and u
1
i
; u
2
i
. If i lies and says
e
u
1
i
;
e
u
2
i
:
Case 1: [f
1
( u
1
); f
2
( u
2
)] 6= [f
1
(
e
u
1
i
; u
1
 i
); f
2
(
e
u
2
i
; u
2
 i
)].
Here, by the strict preferences and strategy-proofness of f
1
; f
2
, for small enough ",
there can be no gain in lying under
b
f
"
.
Case 2: [f
1
( u
1
); f
2
( u
2
)] = [f
1
(
e
u
1
i
; u
1
 i
); f
2
(
e
u
2
i
; u
2
 i
)].
Here, lying can only hurt, since the preferences of the other agents have not changed
and the starting decisions from which
b
f
"
is determined are the same, and so the change
can only go against i's preferences.
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